Yeshiva University, Cardozo School of Law

LARC @ Cardozo Law
AELJ Blog

Journal Blogs

4-14-2020

AT&T v. United States: Vertical Mergers in the
Telecommunications Market
Samantha Kocharov
Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal

Follow this and additional works at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/aelj-blog
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Kocharov, Samantha, "AT&T v. United States: Vertical Mergers in the Telecommunications Market" (2020).
AELJ Blog. 237.
https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/aelj-blog/237

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal Blogs at LARC @ Cardozo Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in AELJ Blog by an authorized administrator of LARC @ Cardozo Law. For more information,
please contact christine.george@yu.edu, ingrid.mattson@yu.edu.

AT&T v. United States: Vertical Mergers in the
Telecommunications Market
BY SAMANTHA KOCHAROV/ ON APRIL 14, 2020

Photo by Samson on Unsplash
In November of 2017, the United States Department of Justice brought its first vertical merger
challenge in several decades. Considered one of the largest acquisitions in history,[1] this
merger represents a regular pattern of cable and media companies to consolidate in the name
of cost efficiencies.[2] Be it good or bad, there is no question that the consolidation of
telecommunication and media companies affects our lives on a daily basis. The more content
producers a single distributor owns, the more content that distributor’s customers get to
enjoy. Take Disney+ for example, where Disney’s ownership of National Geographic, ESPN,
Marvel, and other content producers allows it to provide its customers with a wide variety of
content and packages that it otherwise would not be able to.[3] However, as the government
argued, these acquisitions are not always in the public’s best interest.[4]
A vertical merger is the result of an acquisition of one company by another company which
operates at a different level of the same supply chain or in a different market altogether.[5] In
either case, the firms were not competitors with each other in the same market. Firms seek to
acquire other firms in their supply chain with the hope of improving efficiency and reducing
costs.[6] A vertical merger effectively eliminates the costs of negotiation and finding suppliers.

Because the firms in this instance are not in direct competition with each other to begin with,
the merger of the two is less of a threat to competition than horizontal mergers (mergers
between direct competitors).
However, vertical mergers become suspect when their effect is to reduce a competitor’s
access to supplies. The principal concern with vertical mergers is the possibility that rival firms
will be denied access to significant suppliers or customers, or be treated on unfair terms,
putting them at a significant competitive disadvantage to the merging firms and thus allowing
the merged firms to charge consumers higher prices.[7]
In 2016, AT&T, a content distributor, announced its plan to begin a vertical merger with Time
Warner, a content producer.[8] After the announcement of the deal, the DOJ filed a lawsuit
against AT&T and Time Warner to block the proposed merger—its first major challenge to
such a merger in several decades.[9] The case went to the District Court of the District of
Columbia, where Judge Leon, the same judge that oversaw the Comcast-NBCU merger,
approved the merger, but this time, without imposing any limitations on the merged entity’s
conduct.[10]
After the DOJ’s announcement that it would sue to block the merger there was speculation
that this move was a direct result of political influence from the White House.[11] Many
commentators have contended that the DOJ’s challenge to the merger was a direct
submission to the Trumps’ animosity toward CNN, a Turner-owned network.[12] The
speculation arose after then presidential candidate Donald Trump vowed in a rally that his
administration would not allow this merger to go through.[13] Then, in 2019, reports were
released finding that a few months before the Justice Department filed its lawsuit, President
Trump pressured Gary Cohn, then director of the National Economic Council, to tell the Justice
Department to block AT&T’s Time Warner deal.[14] This sort of information has raised fears
for many of the executive branch utilizing its enforcement agencies to instill its own political
media arm (here, FOX news).[15]
Whatever the incentive, this remains the first time the government has filed suit to block a
vertical merger since 1977, when the DOJ sought to force Hammermill, a paper manufacturer,
to divest itself of two paper distributors it had acquired in the 1960s.[16] There, the DOJ
believed the acquisitions had violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act by “substantially lessening
competition” in the market for the “manufacture and sale of printing and fine paper.”[17]
The court in Hammermill found that it was very unlikely that Hammermill would manipulate
its purchased paper distributors in a way that would harm its competing distributors’ ability to
sell to them.[18] Unlike in the Time Warner–AT&T case, the actual merger of Hammermill and
the paper distribution companies occurred a decade before the case was brought by the
DOJ.[19] Thus, the judge in Hammermill had the opportunity to look at the actual effects of
the merger and the firm’s conduct post-merger. The court found that Hammermill had no

intent to foreclose on its competitors, but rather was preserving the independent paper
merchant distribution system.[20] In AT&T, on the other hand, evidence was based on
projections and forward-looking analysis.
Since Hammermill, vertical merger enforcement has generally taken the form of settlements–
consent decrees–where the merging parties agree to abide by certain conditions for a limited
number of years.[21] This pattern is considered to be, at least in part, due to an increased
amount of scholarship suggesting that vertical mergers raise few competitive risks and have
more inherent procompetitive effects than horizontal mergers.[22] Thus, the agencies that
regulate these mergers and the courts that consider any challenges to them operate on the
presumption that a proposed vertical merger is likely to be beneficial to consumers.[23]
However, industries have developed substantially since Hammermill. Big business is
everywhere, companies are constantly changing hands, and with the rise of technology and
media, it is unclear what the benefits and costs of conglomeration and acquisitions really are.
And further, mergers and acquisitions are on the rise.[24]
This difficulty is exasperated by the fact that since the Hart-Scott Radio Antitrust Improvement
Act of 1976, merger law operates prospectively.[25] Under Hart-Scott Radio, rather than
analyzing the actual effects of the merger, like in Hammermill, courts must base their
decisions on both sides’ economists’ analyses of the market and how it will be affected by the
merger.[26]
The $85 billion merger between AT&T and Time Warner provided an opportunity to update
U.S. antitrust law to deal with the competitive realities of this new era. AT&T’s merger with
Time Warner is one example of the growing tendency among telecommunication companies
towards consolidation. In the telecom and media world, rapid technological changes, massive
economies of scale, and our natural inclinations to be a part of the same networks have
helped to incentive firms to monopolize and demonstrate winner-take-all behavior.
However, rather than take this unique opportunity in history to update U.S. vertical merger
law to reflect the complexities of modern markets, the courts that decided United States v.
AT&T reinforced the stringent standard the government has to overcome. The likely result is
that a vertical merger will probably not be challenged in the near future, giving the agencies
the option of either imposing structural remedies or allowing the merger to go through with
no restrictions.
Sam Kocharov is a Second Year Law Student at the Benjamin Cardozo School of Law and a Staff
Editor at the Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal. Sam is interested in housing and
consumer rights law.

[1] The five biggest media mergers of all time, Fox Business (Dec. 3, 2018),
https://www.foxbusiness.com/features/the-five-biggest-media-mergers-of-all-time.
[2] Steven Pearlstein, How Judge Leon blew it with U.S. v. AT&T, The Wash. Post (June 15, 2018,
3:07 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/06/15/how-judge-leonblew-it-with-u-s-v-att/.
[3] Mighty Max, Every Company Disney Owns: A Map of Disney’s Worldwide Assets, Title Max,
https://www.titlemax.com/discovery-center/money-finance/companies-disney-ownsworldwide/.
[4] JL2977, Mergers are on the Rise: Is it Good for the Economy?, The Yale Tribune (June 7,
2018), https://campuspress.yale.edu/tribune/mergers-are-on-the-rise-is-it-a-good-thing-forthe-economy/
[5] Koren W. Wong-Ervin, Antitrust Analysis of Vertical Mergers: Recent Developments and
Economic Teachings, ABA Antitrust Source,
[6] Ian Linton, What is a Horizontal Merger and a Vertical Merger?, Small Business: Advertising
& Marketing (Nov. 14, 2018), https://smallbusiness.chron.com/horizontal-merger-verticalmerger-60981.html
[7] Antitrust Law Developments 8th Edition Vol. II
[8] Nathan Reiff, AT&T and Time Warner Merger Case: What You Need to Know, Investopedia
(Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.investopedia.com/investing/att-and-time-warner-merger-casewhat-you-need-know/.
[9] Complaint, United States v. AT&T, 310 F. Supp. 3d 161 (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 1:17-cv-02511);
Nathan Reiff, AT&T and Time Warner Merger Case: What You Need to Know, Investopedia
(Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.investopedia.com/investing/att-and-time-warner-merger-casewhat-you-need-know/.
[10] See United States v. AT&T, 310 F. Supp 3d 161 (D.D.C. 2018).
[11] Hadas Gold, Report: Trump asked Gary Cohn to block AT&T-Time Warner merger, CNN
Business (Mar. 4, 2019, 4:53 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/04/media/att-time-warnertrump-gary-cohn/index.html; Jane Mayer, The Making of The Fox News White House, The New
Yorker (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/03/11/the-making-of-thefox-news-white-house; Aaron Pressman, What AT&T Could Do If Trump Blocks the Time
Warner Deal, Fortune (Nov. 9, 2016, 9:06 AM), https://fortune.com/2016/11/09/att-trumpblocks-time-warner/.

[12] Dade Hayes, DOJ Antitrust Chief Makan Delrahim On Failed AT&T Appeal: “You Learn
More From Losing Than From Winning”, Deadline (Mar. 20, 2019, 12:31 PM),
https://deadline.com/2019/03/doj-antitrust-chief-makan-delrahim-on-failed-att-appeal-youlearn-more-from-losing-than-from-winning-1202579284/; J. William Carpenter, 3 Major
Companies Owned by Time Warner, Investopedia (Oct. 14, 2018),
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/markets/102215/top-3-companies-owned-timewarner.asp
[13] Aaron Pressman, What AT&T Could Do If Trump Blocks the Time Warner Deal, Fortune
(Nov. 9, 2016, 9:06 AM), https://fortune.com/2016/11/09/att-trump-blocks-time-warner/.
[14] Jane Mayer, The Making of The Fox News White House, The New Yorker (Mar. 4, 2019),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/03/11/the-making-of-the-fox-news-whitehouse.
[15] Id.
[16] Jake Warner & William F. Cavanaugh, Jr., The Last Time DOJ Sued to Block a Vertical
Merger Was Over Forty Years Ago…And It Lost, Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP (Jan. 8,
2018). https://www.pbwt.com/antitrust-update-blog/the-last-time-doj-sued-to-block-avertical-merger-was-over-forty-years-ago-and-it-lost.
[17] United States v. Hammermill, 429 F. Supp. 1271, 1274 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
[18] Id. at 1293.
[19] See United States v. AT&T, 310 F. Supp 3d 161 (D.D.C. 2018).
[20] Hammermill, 429 F. Supp. at 1288–89.
[21] Arthur J. Burke, Ronan P. Harty, Jon Leibowitz, Howard Shelanski & Jesse Solomon, Davis
Polk Discusses FTC Scrutiny of Vertical Mergers, The CLS Blue (Oct. 3, 2019),
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/10/03/davis-polk-discusses-ftc-scrutiny-of-verticalmergers/#_ftn1
[22] Id.
[23] JL2977, Mergers are on the Rise: Is it Good for the Economy?, The Yale Tribune (June 7,
2018), https://campuspress.yale.edu/tribune/mergers-are-on-the-rise-is-it-a-good-thing-forthe-economy/; U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines (June 14, 1984),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1175141/download?mkwid=c; Christine S. Wilson,
Commissioner, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Keynote Address at the GCR Live 8th Annual Antitrust
Law Leaders Forum: Vertical Merger PolicyL What Do We Know and Where Do We Go (Feb. 1,

2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1455670/wilson__vertical_merger_speech_at_gcr_2-1-19.pdf.
[24] JL2977, Mergers are on the Rise: Is it Good for the Economy?, The Yale Tribune (June 7,
2018), https://campuspress.yale.edu/tribune/mergers-are-on-the-rise-is-it-a-good-thing-forthe-economy/.
[25] Andrew Gavil, William Kovacic, Jonathan Baker & Joshua Wright, Antitrust Law in
Perspective, Cases Concepts and Problems in Competition Policy 674 (3d ed. 2016).
[26] Id.; United States v. Hammermill, 429 F. Supp. 1271 (W.D. Pa. 1977); see United States v.
AT&T, 310 F. Supp 3d 161 (D.D.C. 2018).

